Substitutability and disgorgement damages in contract by Barnett, K
17 
Substitutability and disgorgement damages 
in contract 
KATY BARNETT• 
The principles governing the award of disgorgement damages for breach 
of contract remain opaque. In the leading judgment in Attorney-General v 
Blake,1 Lord Nicholls proposed a 'legitimate interest' test for determin-
ing when a breach of contract would give rise to an account of profits. 
However, continuing uncertainty about what constitute.s a legitimate 
interest has made the test notoriously difficult to apply. In that context, 
Lord Steyn's remark, that '[e]xceptions to the general principle that there 
is no remedy for disgorgement of profits against a contract breaker are 
best hammered out on the anvil of concrete cases? simply highlights 
the need for concrete criteria to guide the enquiry. The fact remains that, 
nine years after Blake was decided, and notwithstanding numerous cases 
addressing the question, there is no settled judicial approach as to when 
disgorgement of profits will be awarded for breach of contract. 
This chapter suggests that the concept of'substitutability' is an import-
ant key to the enquiry which must be made by courts. Substitutability is 
already a criterion for the award of specific relief. But the way in which 
substitutability is applied to determine a plaintiff's right to disgorgement 
in different contexts needs to be nuanced. This chapter explains that, for 
what are here called the 'second sale' cases, the central question is whether 
the subject matter of the contract was substitutable. However, the chapter 
goes on to explain that for the so-called 'agency problem' cases, substi-
tutability is not the only factor, although it remains relevant. The plaintiff 
' This paper is dedicated to my friend, teacher, mentor and thesis supervisor, Michael 
Bryan, without whose support I would not have undertaken postgraduate studies. Special 
thanks to Robert Chambers, Michael Bryan, Andrew Robertson, James Edelman and the 
editors for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors, of course, remain 
my own. 
1 [2001]1 AC 268 ('Blake'). 2 Ibid 291. 
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must also have reposed trust in the defendant, or there must be another 
public policy reason for the contract to be effected by an award of dis-
gorgement damages. These criteria suggest an important overlap between 
the award of disgorgement damages for breach of negative contractual 
covenants and account of profits for breach of fiduciary duty. 
A. Substitutability: a key to determining liability 
for disgorgement damages 
Substitutability is central to the justification of specific performance of 
contracts. Specific relief will be ordered in circumstances where the plain-
tiff would be unable (or would find it very difficult) to procure a substitute 
performance. 3 Because the plaintiff will suffer a non-compensable loss as 
a result of the defendant's non-performance, the plaintiff is justified in 
compelling the defendant to perform the contract. 
Various commentators have noted that if specific relief was or ought 
to have been available to a plaintiff in a contract claim, but is no longer 
available, it is likely that the plaintiff may be able to seek disgorgement 
damages.4 Disgorgement is awarded in lieu of performance if the prom-
isee would have been or was awarded specific relief before the prom-
isor put the remedy out of the promisee's reach. 5 A similar analysis by 
Robert Stevens argues that damages are awarded as a substitute for a 
right of which a person has been deprived.6 Where the promisor has 
deprived the promisee of performance and made a profit thereby, it is 
argued that the 'next best' solution is to cause the defendant to disgorge 
his gains. 
3 Adderley v Dixon (1824) l Sim & St 607, 610; 57 ER 239, 240 ('Adderley'). 
4 SM Waddams, 'Restitution as Part of Contract Law' in A Burrows (ed), Essays on the Law of 
Restitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991) 197; JEdelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, 
Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002) 152-5; P Benson, 
'Disgorgement for Breach of Contract and Corrective Justice: An Analysis in Outline' 
in JW Neyers, M Mcinnes and SGA Pi tel (eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2004) 327-30; P Jaffey, 'Disgorgement and "Licence Fee Damages" 
in Contract' (2004) 20 JCL l, 10; MA Eisenberg, 'The Disgorgement Interest in Contract 
"Law' (2006) lOS MichL Rev 559, 582; R Cunnington, 'The Measure and Availability 
of Gain-Based Damages for Breach of Contract' in R Cunnington and D Saidov (eds), 
Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives(Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2008) 205-42; R Cunnington, 'The Inadequacy of Damages as a Remedy for Breach of 
Contract' in CEF Rickett (ed), Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2008) 115-45. 
5 Eisenberg (n 4) 584. 
6 R Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 60. 
SUBSTITUTABILITY AND DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES '379 
These analyses all accept that disgorgement damages should only be 
ordered when: (1) damages are inadequate to compensate for breach; 
(2) specific relief is no longer available; and (3) the defendant has made a 
profit from breaching the contract. Disgorgement damages are a tertiary 
remedy, only available when the secondary remedy of specific relief is 
unavailable. It is also widely accepted that disgorgement damages should 
_.., be available where the contractual relationship involves a concurrent 
fiduciary relationship.7 
The principle of substitutability plays a key role in determining when 
damages are inadequate such that specific relief could, in principle, be 
available, and hence disgorgement damages in cases where specific relief 
is not, in fact, available. However, although substitutability helps estab-
lish whether disgorgement damages should be available for breach of con-
tract, the thesis of this chapter is that it needs to be nuanced and its role 
further clarified. To this end, the case law can be broken down into two 
categories of cases where disgorgement damages may be available. 
(1) 'Second sale' cases. Alice contracts with Boris, but Boris breaches his 
contract with Alice and sells to Conrad for a profit. Typically, the con-
tract between Alice and Boris is no longer specifically enforceable but 
there is a profit for Boris to disgorge. 
(2) 'Agency problem' cases.8 Boris promises Alice he will not do a specific 
thing which relates to Alice's best interests, but Boris then breaches 
the contract and goes ahead and does the very thing which he has 
contracted not to do, making a profit as a consequence. 
The chapter argues that, in both scenarios, some kind of advertent con-
duct is necessary in the context ofbreach of contract. This is because of the 
punitive and deterrent rationales behind disgorgement damages. There 
must be a conscious or advertent indifference to the rights of the plaintiff 
for the punishment to be deserved.9 Further, the deterrence aspect seems 
more appropriate and proportionate if the wrongful actions are conscious 
and advertent. 
Substitutability is important in this context in establishing the blame-
worthiness of a defendant's conduct, as it helps to ascertain when it is 
7 Edelman (n 4) 152-5. 
8 
'Agency' in this article is used in an economic sense rather than the legal sense. This will 
be discussed in further detail in Part C. 
9 B Chapman and M Trebilcock, 'Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale' 
(1989) 40 Ala L Rev 741, 780-3. CfJH Dawson, 'Restitution Without Enrichment' (1981) 
61 B U L Rev 563, 614. 
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1. Contracts for sale of land 
Land has been 'accorded a unique status as a symbol of the self and as 
a resource closely linked to personal freedom, rank and power'.15 It 
has a 'peculiar and special value', and therefore is intrinsically non-
substitutable. Specific performance of contracts for sale of land will usu-
~ .. ally be ordered.16 However, some doubt has been cast over the special 
status ofland by a majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in Semelhago 
v ParamadevanP Sopinka J, in delivering the majority judgment, said in 
obiterthat developments in modern real estate meant every piece of real 
estate was no longer unique.18 His Honour concluded: 
Specific performance should, therefore, not be granted as a matter of 
course absent evidence that the property is unique to the extent that its 
substitute would not be readily available19 
As Robert Chambers has argued, this misunderstands the reasoning 
behind specific performance, because the purchaser may be able to 
find property with very similar features, but will not be able to obtain 
exactly the same land from another vendor. 20 Damages cannot be an 
adequate response where a plaintiff is unable to get a full substitute 
for the benefit for which she bargained. Semelhago v Paramadevan is 
contradicted in Australia by Barwick CJ's dicta in Pianta v National 
Finance & Trustees Ltd.21 
Lake v Bayliss22 and Bunny Industries Ltd v FSW Enterprises Pty 
Ltd23 suggest that courts have long been willing effectively to award 
15 Dagan (n 14) 138. 
16 Adderley (n 3); Dougan v Ley (1946) 71 CLR 142 ('Dougan v Ley'). Specific performance of 
a contract for sale of land is nevertheless subject to discretionary considerations: see eg, 
Patel v Ali [1984]1 Ch 283 (hardship on the defendant);Summers v Cocks (1927) 40 CLR 
321 (lack of clean hands of the plaintiff). 
17 [1996]2 SCR415, 136 DLR (4th) 1 ('Semelhago v Paramadevan'). Note that La Forest J dis-
sented on that issue, saying (at 2): 'However, given the assumption under which the case 
was argued, I prefer not to deal with the circumstances giving rise to entitlement to spe-
cific performance or generally the interpretation that should be given to the legislation 
authorizing the award of damages in lieu of specific performance. In considering modi-
fication to existing law, both these interdependent factors may well require examination, 
and the arguments in this case were not made in those terms.' 
18 Ibid 10. 19 Ibid. 
20 R Chambers, 'The Importance of Specific Performance' in S Degeling and J Edelman 
(eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Lawbook Co, Sydney 2005) 431. CfW Swadling, 'The 
Vendor-Purchaser Constructive Trust' in Degeling and Edelman (above) 463. 
21 (1964) 180 CLR 146, 151 (Barwick CJ). 
22 [1974]1 WLR 1073 ('Lake v Bayliss') cited by Lord Nicholls in Blake (n 1) 284. 
23 [1982] Qd R 712 ('Bunny Industries'). 
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appropriate from a punitive and deterrent perspective to impose disgorge-
ment damages. Justice Chapman and Michael Trebilcock have argued 
that, ordinarily, remedies which exact punishment and deterrence are 
not appropriate for breach of contract, even if the breach is intentional.10 
The breaching party is not denying the relevance of the plaintiffs rights; 
rather he is prepared to pay damages flowing from that breach if proven.11 
'· However, the counter to this is that if a substitute performance cannot 
be procured, damages will be inadequate, and the defendant's conduct 
becomes a denial of the plaintiff's rights. If the subject matter of a contract 
is unique, the promisor's conduct is blameworthy because the promisee 
will be unable to procure a substitute performance from elsewhere. In 
such contracts, it is also appropriate that promisors should be deterred 
from breaching the contract and depriving the promisee of performance. 
On the other hand, if a performance is substitutable, then disgorgement 
damages should not be awarded, even if the breach is entirely advertent. 12 
In this sense, as will be discussed in the conclusion to the next section, 
substitutability leaves open the possibility of'efficient breach'. 
B. Substitutability and second sale cases 
The second sale cases occur when a vendor sells property, goods or ser-
vices to a purchaser, but then breaches his contract with the purchaser to 
sell the item more profitably to a third partyY Whether or not disgorge-
ment damages will be available depends on where the subject matter of the 
contract sits on the spectrum: from fungible property, goods or services 
at one end (which a plaintiff can easily procure from elsewhere) to unique 
property, goods or services at the other end (which cannot be procured 
from elsewhere).14 Looking at the categories of land, chattels and goods, 
shares and stock, and services in turn, the chapter will first consider the 
way in which courts have established whether or not the particular sub-
ject matter of a contract is substitutable for the purposes of awarding 
specific relief, and then whether or not courts have been prepared to order 
disgorgement damages. 
1° Chapman and Trebilcock (n 9). 11 Ibid 783. 12 Jaffey (n 4) 7-9. 
13 The second sale cases encompass all kinds of benefits transferrable under contract, 
including land, goods, chattels and services. 
14 H Dagan, 'Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract' (2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law 115, 134-36; S The! and P Siegelman, 'The Role of Disgorgement in Contract 
Law' (Fordham Legal Studies Research Paper No 1353402 2009) 21 <http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=l353402>. 
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disgorgement damages for a breach of a contract to sell land, well before 
Blake This is unsurprising, given the intrinsically non-substitutable 
nature of land. In each case, the vendor breached the contract with the 
initial purchaser and sold the land for a profit to a third party. In Lake v 
Bayliss, the matter was further complicated because the vendor contracted 
to convey the land to the purchaser in return for the purchaser withdraw-
~-. ing two legal claims against her. In both cases, the vendor was said to be a 
trustee of the proceeds of sale and had to account for them (subject to the 
purchaser providing the requisite consideration). 24 The effect was to force 
the vendor to disgorge his or her profits to the purchaser. 
The result in these cases has been justified by reference to the con-
structive trust which is said to arise upon execution of the contract of 
sale and before settlement occurs. But the trust analogy has always been 
unsatisfactory, as noted in Lysaght v Edwards.25 Sir Thomas Plumer MR 
in Wall v Bright26 described the vendor as 'in progress towards' bare 
trusteeship. A vendor will only become a bare trustee when the whole 
of the purchase moneys are paid and the vendor is bound by contract 
to convey. In any case, the Australian High Court has thrown the con-
structive trust analysis into doubt in Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v 
CauchiY US courts have also rejected the constructive trust analysis.28 
The constructive trust analysis suffers particular problems in the second 
sale cases, because it is said to arise from the specifically enforceable nature 
of the contract for sale ofland. In Lake v Bayliss and Bunny Industries, the 
contracts of sale were no longer actually specifically enforceable, because 
the land had been conveyed to a third party. Nonetheless, in both cases, 
the courts found that the vendor was subject to fiduciary duties arising 
from the constructive trust. 
In an attempt to bypass the difficulties of the constructive trust ana-
lysis, American scholars have categorized the remedies in the second sale 
cases as expectation damages.29 There is said to be an implied term in 
contracts of sale that the vendor will not seek out or accept more prof-
itable offers, and the buyer is said to pay an implicit premium for that 
promise. It is argued that when a vendor is forced to disgorge his profits in 
24 Lake v Bayliss (n 22) 1076; Bunny Industries (n 23) 717-19. 
25 (1876) 2 Ch D 499, 510. See also Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191, II ER 999; 
Swadling (n 20). 
26 (1820) I Jac & W 494, 503; 37 ER 456,459. 27 (2001) 217 CLR 315 ('Tanwar'). 
28 Laurin v DeCarolis Construction Co, 363 NE 2d 675 (Mass 1977). 
29 EA Farnsworth, 'Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in 
Breach of Contract' (1985) 94 Yale LJ 1339, 1364-5; Eisenberg (n 4) 582. 
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a second sale scenario, this is a form of expectation damages, because the 
purchaser has paid for the right to any profit gained by the vendor pursu-
ant to the implied term. 30 The difficulty with this analysis is that, like the 
constructive trust analysis, it involves a fiction: namely, that if the vendor 
sold to someone else, the parties agreed the purchaser would be entitled 
to the profit made by the vendor. This chapter suggests that it is better to 
,,, avoid such fictions altogether. 
In Blake, Lord Nicholls suggested that Lake v Bayliss should be seen 
as a case of disgorgement of profits for breach of contract. 31 The second 
sale cases make much more sense if one sees them in this light, and 
the constructive trust analysis is abandoned once the land has been 
conveyed to a third party. Further, this avoids unduly stretching the 
definition of expectation damages by importing fictions about implied 
clauses. 
2. Contracts for sale of goods or chattels 
Where contracts for sale of goods or chattels involve a good or chattel 
that can easily be obtained elsewhere, the general principle is that dam-
ages will be adequate compensation for non-performance.32 However, 
a good or chattel may be non-substitutable if it is rare,33 or it would be 
very difficult for a plaintiff to procure an equivalent substitute perform-
ance because the defendant is particularly well situated to meet the plain-
tiff's needs.34 Sometimes, there may be an instalment contract to supply 
goods and services over a long period of time. 35 This is not substitutable 
because a complex contract cannot be replaced with an identical deal. In 
some circumstances, although a good or chattel is generally fungible, it 
30 Eisenberg (n 4) 582. 31 Blake (n 1) 284. 
32 Adderley (n 3) 610; 240. However, The! and Siegelman (n 14) 9-15 argue that even where 
compensatory damages are concerned, the market damage measure means disgorgement 
is effectively available if the market value is greater than the original contract value - see 
eg, Goods Act 1958 (Vic) s 56(3) for an Australian example. 
33 Fa/eke v Gray (1859) 4 Drew 651,62 ER 250; Burr v Bloomburg, 101 NT Eq 615, 318 A 876 
(1927); Dougan v Ley (n 16); Aristoc Industries Pty Ltd v R A Wenham (Builders) Pty Ltd 
[1965] NSWR 581. 
34 See eg, North v Great Northern Railway Company (1860) 2 Giff64, 66 ER28; Sky Petroleum 
Ltd v VIP Petroleum Ltd [1974]1 WLR 577 ('Sky Petroleum'). 
35 Buxton v Lister (1746) 3 Atk 383, 26 ER 1020; Adderley (n 3); Eastern Rolling Mill v 
Michlovitz, 157 Md 51, 145 A 378 (1929); Sky Petroleum (n 34); Thomas Borthwick v South 
Otago Freezing [1978]1 NZLR 538. Cf Fothergill v Rowland (1873) LR 17 Eq 132, 140; 
Laclede Gas Co v Amoco Oil Cq 845 F 2d 76,80 (4th Cir, 1975). 
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may be unavailable because of particular circumstances at that time. 36 
For example, in Howard Perry & Co v British Railways, 37 members of the 
National Union of Railwaymen had refused to transport steel in a gesture 
of solidarity with striking steelworkers. The plaintiffs were steel stock-
holders, and had consignments of steel waiting to be delivered in two of 
the defendant's depots. The steel could not be kept for a long period of 
'· time because it would harden and become unmalleable, and would thus 
be unworkable. The defendants would not allow the plaintiffs to collect 
the steel from the depots themselves. Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought 
delivery up of the goods pursuant to the contract. Megarry VC explained 
why steel was non-substitutable in the particular circumstances: 
If a plaintiff can easily replace the goods detained by purchasing their 
equivalent on the market, then the payment of damages out of which 
the price of the equivalent may be paid is adequate compensation to the 
wronged plaintiff, and there is little or no point in making an order for the 
delivery of the goods. Far better to let the plaintiff fend for himself with 
the defendant's money. 
In normal times, the steel here in dispute might indeed be in this cat-
egory; but these times are not normal, and at present steel is obtainable on 
the market only with great difficulty, if at all. If the equivalent of what is 
detained is unobtainable, how can it be said that damages are an adequate 
remedy? They plainly are not. Mr Irvine observed that at present 'steel is 
gold', and one can see what he meant. Yet even that may not do justice to 
his cause, since as far as I know gold is still available on the open market 
to those who pay the price. 38 
Disgorgement damages have been awarded in Adras Building Material 
Ltd v Harlow & Jones GmbH,39 an Israeli case which is highly reminiscent 
of Howard Perry. The defendant Harlow, a German company, entered 
into a contract of sale with the plaintiff Adras, an Israeli company. The 
contract provided that the defendant would supply the plaintiff with 
7,000 tons of iron at a price of 570 Deutschmarks per ton. There was a 
delay in delivery because of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, but 
5,025 tons were shipped to the plaintiff in early 1974. On 8 Aprill974, the 
defendant told the plaintiff that it had to sell the remaining iron because 
36 Curtice Bros v Catts, 72 NJ Eq 831, 833; 66 A 935,936 (1907) (scarcity of tomatoes for 
a cannery); Sky Petroleum (n 34) (scarcity of petroleum); Eastern Air Lines v Gulf Oil 
Corporation, 415 F Supp 429,442-3 (1975); Howard Perry & Co v British Railways [1980] 
1 WLR l375 ('Howard Perry'). 
37 Howard Perry (n 36). 38 Ibid 1383 (emphasis added). 
39 (1998) 42(1) PD 221 CAdras') translated in (1995) 3 RLR 235, 27l. 
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ofhigh storage costs. In fact the price of iron had spiked, and the defend-
ant profited by selling the iron to a third party in Hamburg for a price 
ofDM804.70 per ton. The plaintiff did not obtain an alternative supply 
of iron and sued to recover damages for breach of contract pursuant to 
the Sale (International Sale of Goods) Law 1971 (Israel),40 and to recover 
the profit made by the defendant in respect of the sale of the remaining 
iron.41 
A majority of the Supreme Court oflsrael42 found that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover the defendant's profit. Barak J noted that the plaintiff 
had a right under Israeli law to specific performance, and suggested that 
disgorgement was appropriate because the defendant had deprived the 
plaintiff of its right to performance.43 It has been suggested that Adras 
represents a dangerously broad approach to disgorgement damages.44 The 
Court did not consider whether Adras could have procured a substitute 
performance. However, if the Court had found that the Yom Kippur War 
had prevented Adras from procuring a substitute performance, then the 
result would have been justifiable. Substitutability would have provided a 
coherent limitation on the Adras principle. 
If it is difficult to procure a substitute performance, and specific relief 
is no longer available, then disgorgement damages should also be avail-
able. For example in Dougan v Ley, the contract involved the transfer of a 
taxi licence which was scarce and difficult to acquire, but not impossible45 
The plaintiff sought specific performance and succeeded in gaining it, so 
clearly the court regarded the benefit under the contract as non-substi-
tutable. If for some reason specific performance was no longer available, 
but there was a profit from the on-sale of the taxi licence to a third party, 
then, in the absence of relevant defences, disgorgement damages should 
have been available. 
40 Authorized English translation: Israeli Ministry of Justice, Laws of the State of Israel 
(Vol25) 32. This statute implements the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods (opened for signature 1 July 1964, entered into force 18 
August 1972) 834 UNTS 107 into Israeli law. 
41 In a previous hearing, the Supreme Court had held that the plaintiffhad never terminated 
the contract, and therefore the plaintiff had failed to prove any loss: see Adras Building 
Material Ltd v Harlow & Jones GmbH (1983) 37(4) PD 225. 
42 Comprised of SLevin, Barak and Bach JJ. Ben Porath VP and D Levin J dissented on the 
basis that the property in question was non-specific. 
43 Adras (RLR) (n 39) 271 citing Rabihai v Man Shaket Ltd (in liq) (1977) 33(2) PD 281, 295. 
See also Contract (Remedies) Law 1970 (Israel) s 3. 
44 H Dagan, 'The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice' (1999) 98 MichL Rev 138. 
45 Dougan v Ley (n 16) 151-2 (Dixon J), 153-4 (Williams J). 
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3. Contracts for shares and stock 
Generally, shares are substitutable, and will be readily available on the 
open market at a certain price. Public shares on the open market are likely 
to be substitutable, and if they are, a court will not order specific perform-
ance for a contract for the sale of shares or stock.46 However, sometimes 
there will not be an adequate market for a particular share or stock.47 In 
other circumstances, the market price for shares might be uncertain or 
there may be a risk that requiring the plaintiff to purchase the shares with 
damages will prejudice the plaintiff or a third party. In these circum-
stances, a court will also order specific performance.48 
If a second sale case arose which involved unique shares or a situation 
where the market price was uncertain, it is suggested that by analogy with 
the cases above, disgorgement damages should be available. 
4. Contracts for services 
The question of the substitutability of personal services is fraught with 
difficulty. Courts are generally reluctant to order specific performance for 
contracts for services,49 on the basis that it is inappropriate to compel an 
unwilling defendant to maintain a continuous personal relationship with 
the plaintiff. 5° 
46 Hyer v Richmond Traction Co, 168 US 471, 483 {1897); Re Schwabacher, 98 LT 127, 128 
{1907) ('Schwabacher'); Chinn v Hochstrasser [1979] Ch 447,470. 
47 Cud v Rutter {1719) I P Wms 569,24 ER 521; Duncuft v Albrecht {1841) 12 Sim 189,59 ER 
ll04; Paine v Hutchinson {1868) LR 3 Ch 388; Dougan v Ley (n 16) 151; General Securities 
Corporation v Welton, 223 Ala 299, 135 So 329 {1931) ('General Securities'); Rudder v 
George Hudson Holdings Ltd [1972]1 NSWLR 529; Georges v Wieland [2009] NSWSC 733 
('Georges v Wieland') [17]-[25]. 
48 Schwabacher (n 46) 128; General Securities (n 47); ANZ Executors and Trustees Ltd v 
Humes Ltd [1990] VR 615, 630-l (Brooking J); Georges v Wieland (n 47). 
49 Rigby v Connol (1880) 14 Ch D 482, 487 (Jesse! MR) ('Rigby'); H W Gossard Co v Crosby, 
132 Iowa 155, 170, 109 NW 483, 488-9 {1906) ('H W Gossard Co'); I C Williamson Ltd v 
Lukey and Mulholland {1931) 45 CLR 282 ('I C Williamson') 293 {Starke J); Hogan v 
Tumut Shire Council {1954) 54 SR (NSW) 284 ('Hogan'); Francis v Municipal Councillors 
of Kuala Lumpur [1962]3 AllER 633 ('Francis'); Sampson v Murray, 415 US 61,83 {1974) 
('Sampson v Murray'); American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of the Law of 
Contracts (American Law Institute Publishers, St Paul198l) § 367. The US position is fur-
ther complicated by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which says 'neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude' shall exist in the US. 
50 Wolverhampton and Walsa/1 Railway Co v London NW Rwy Co {1873) LR 16 Eq 433; Rigby 
(n 49) 487 (Jesse! MR); H W Gossard Co (n 49) 170; 488-9; I C Williamson (n 49) 293 
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However, in some circumstances, a court may order an injunction to 
restrain a breach of a negative covenant where a defendant has agreed not 
to provide their services to any person other than the plaintiff, particu-
larlywhere the services involved are unique. The cases involve employees 
such as opera singers, 51 acrobats,52 sportsmen, 53 actors and actresses54 and 
television presenters,55 all of whom provide unique services. In US cases, 
there is explicit consideration of the uniqueness of the services provided 56 
because of the way in which Lumley v Wagner57 was interpreted by US 
textbook writers. 58 Courts effectively consider substitutability as a deter-
minant of injunctive relief. If an employee can easily be replaced, dam-
ages will suffice, but if an employee possesses special qualities and has 
agreed not to move to a competitor, they will be restrained by injunction 
(so long as such restraint is reasonable). 
Sometimes it is difficult to predict when the services of an employee 
will be unique. In two American cases decided within days of one another, 
(Starke ]);Atlas Steels (Australia) Pty Ltd v Atlas Steels Ltd (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 157 CAt/as 
Steels') 161 (Sugarman J); Hogan (n 49); Francis (n 49); Sampson v Murray (n 49) 83. 
51 Lumleyv Wagner (1852) 1 De GM &G 604,42 ER687 ('Lumley v Wagner');Duffv Russell, 
14 NYS 134, 60 J & S 80 (1891); Oscar Hammerstein v Marguerite Mann, 122 NYS 276 
(1910); Chapin v Powers, 73 NYS (2d) 854 (1947). 
52 fohn Cort v Lassard & Lucifer, 18 Ore 221, 22 P 1054 (1889) (non-unique acrobats); Keith v 
Kellermann, 169 F 196 (1909) (unique diver); Shubert Theatrical Ccrv Rath, 271 F 827,20 
ALR 846 (1921) (unique acrobats). 
53 Philadelphia Ball Club Ltd v Lajoie, 202 Pa2l0, 51 A 973 (1902) ('Philadelphia Ball Club'); 
American Baseball and Athletic Association v Harper 54 Cent L J 449 (1902) ('American 
Baseball') (baseballers); Hawthorn Football Club Ltd v Harding (1988] VR 49 ('Harding'); 
Buckenara v Hawthorn Football Club Ltd (1988] VR 39 (Buckenara') (AFL football-
ers); Bulldogs Rugby League Club v Williams [2008] NSWSC 822 ('Williams') (ARL 
footballers). 
54 Montague v Flockton (1873) 16 LR Eq 189; Daly v Smith (1874) 49 How Pr 150; Carter v 
Ferguson, 12 NYS 580, 58 Hun 569 (1890); Grimston v Cuningham (1893) l QB 125 
('Grimston'); Warner Brothers Pictures Inc v Nelson [1937] l KB 209 ('Nelson'); Marco 
Productions Ltd v Pagola [1945]1 KB Ill ('Marco Productions'); Warner Brothers Pictures 
Inc v Ingolia [1966] NSWR 988 ('Ingolia'). 
55 Evening News Association v Peterson, 477 F Supp 77 (1979); American Broadcasting 
Company v Wolf, 52 NY (2d) 394, 420 NE (2d) 363, 438 NYS (2d) 482 (1981); Curro v 
Beyond Productions Pty Ltd (1993) 30 NSWLR 337 ('Curro'). 
56 See eg, Bethlehem Engineering Export Co v Christie, lOS F (2d) 933, 935 (1939) (Learned 
HandJ). 
57 Lumley v Wagner (n 51). 
58 JN Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence (Vol 4) (4th edn Bancroft-Whitney 
Company, San Francisco 1919) §1343, 3218-16. First edition cited with approval in 
Philadelphia Ball Club(n 53) 216; 973. See also JN Pomeroy, Treatise on the Specific 
Performance of Contracts (3rd edn Banks & Company, Albany 1926) §24, 75-7. Earlier 
edition also cited with approval in Philadelphia Ball Club (n 53) 216; 973. 
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both of which involved professional baseball players, 59 the result reached 
by the respective courts were diametrically opposed, so that it has been 
said:-
The one has a solemn judicial finding that he is a person of such attain-
ments in his profession that his position cannot possibly be filled. The 
other is decreed to be simply an ordinary person, whose place can eas-
ily be filled, and whose absence from his post can result in no particular 
or irreparable injury. Lajoie's professional reputation is established and 
enhanced at the cost of his freedom, while Harper gets his freedom at the 
expense of his professional reputation."0 
It seems that in the US, courts are more likely to restrain employees 
with a unique public persona than they are to restrain salespersons and 
managers.61 
By contrast, Australian and English courts do not explicitly consider 
the unique nature of the service provided,62 although some Australian 
cases say that the principle in Lumley v Wagner applies to contracts for 
'special services', inferring that the court is cognizant of the quality of 
the services involved.63 Nevertheless, analysis of the case law suggests 
that substitutability still underlies the reasoning of courts. Actors, foot-
bailers, newsreaders and the like will be restrained from breaching a 
promise not to work for a competitor, so long as the restraint is reason-
able and not too long in duration.64 Managers,65 travelling salespersons,66 
porters,67 or other ordinary employees68 are far less likely to be restrained 
from working for a competitor. There are instances where courts will 
restrain an ordinary employee from working for a competitor for a 
59 Philadelphia Ball Club (n 53) (injunction granted); American Baseball (n 53) (injunction 
refused). 
60 Note to Philadelphia Ball Club Ltd v Lajoie, 90 American State Rep 627, 649 (1902). 
61 HWGossard Co (n 49); Clark Paper& Manufacturing Co vStenacher, 236 NY 312,140 NE 
708 (1923). 
62 The exception to this is Kekewich J's decision at first instance in Whitwood Chemical 
Company v Hardman ('Whitwood') reproduced at [1891]2 Ch 416, 419-23. 
63 Atlas Steels (n 50) 164, 165; Curro (n 55) 347; Williams (n 53) [53)-[54]. 
64 Grimston (n 54); Nelson (n 54); Marco Productions (n 54); Ingolia (n 54); Harding (n 53); 
Buckenara(n 53); Curro (n 55); Williams (n 53). 
65 Whit wood (n 62); Davis v Foreman [1894) 3 Ch 654; Mortimer v Beckett (1920) 1 Ch 571; 
Page One Records v Britton [1968) 1 WLR 157 (Page One Records'); Warren v Mendy 
[1989]1 WLR 853 ('Warren v Mendy'). 
66 Ehrman v Bartholomew [1898]1 Ch 671 ('Ehrman'). 
67 Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893]1 Ch ll6. 
68 Rely-A-Bell Burglar and Fire Alarm Company Ltd v Eisler [1926]1 Ch 609 ('Rely-A-Bell'); 
Heine Bros (Aust) Pty Ltd v Forrest [1963] VR 383 (Heine Bros'). 
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limited time, so long as the restriction does not restrain the employee 
from any employment.69 
Clearly substitutability is not the only issue at play in these cases. First, 
courts do not wish to force people to work in jobs where they are unhappy 
or if they could get a better opportunity elsewhere. Second, using the facts 
of Curro v Beyond Productions Pty Ltd70 as an illustration, if a newsreader 
is prevented from working for another company, there is still a vast range 
of ordinary professions in which she can work. However, if Ms Curro had 
been a woman with limited skills, she would have found it far more dif-
ficult if the court had restrained her from working as a waitress, making 
her effectively unemployable. It follows that if a restriction contained in 
a covenant is excessively severe, courts will refuse to enforce it or limit its 
operation.71 Similarly, if relations between the parties have broken down 
and it is simply not feasible to require co-operation,72 courts will also 
refuse to award an injunction forcing the parties to work together. The 
common law doctrine of restraint of trade also informs the attitude of the 
courts. Under this doctrine, contractual obligations restricting some one's 
ability to trade are void by reason of illegality unless they are reasonable 
and in the interests of both contracting parties and of the public at large.73 
Courts are particularly concerned to safeguard the right of individuals to 
work in their chosen trade or profession without unjust restriction, and 
thus they will scrutinize restraints on employment more closely.74 
Generally, disgorgement damages have not been thought to be avail-
able for breach of a contract for services.75 However, Christopher Wonnell 
has argued that by removing remedies for employers, employees may be 
69 William Robinson & Co v Heuer [1898] 2 Ch 451 ('William Robinson'); Chapman v 
Westerby [1':113] WN 277 ('Chapman'). 
7° Curro (n 55). 
71 Ehrman (n 66); Heine Bros (n 68); William Robinson (n 69); Whitwood (n 62) and Chapman 
(n 69). Cf Rely-A-Bell (n 68). 
72 Page One Records (n 65); Warren v Mendy (n 65). 
73 Bacchus Marsh Concentrated Milk Co Ltd v Joseph Nathan & Co Ltd (in liq) (1919) 26 
CLR 410; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269; Amoco 
Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd [1975] AC 561. 
74 See eg, Lindner v Murdock's Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628, 633; Butt v Long (1953) 88 CLR476; 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (Australia) Pty Ltd v Richards[1963] NSWR 1613; 
Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353;Forbes v NSW Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 242; 
Geraghty v Minter(1979) 142 CLR 177; Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association 
(Inc) (1986) 69 CLR660; RentokilPty Ltd v Lee(1995) 66 SASR 301. CfCurro (n 55) 346. 
75 James Edelman has suggested that disgorgement damages ought to have been available 
in Lumley v Wagner (n 51) had Ms Wagner profited as a result of her breach: Edelman 
(n 4) 158. 
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disempowered, and that the 'enforced servitude' objection specifically 
to performing contracts for services should be thoroughly questioned.76 
He argues that disgorgement damages could be a way of solving the 
dilemma: 
To isolate and safeguard only an employee's interest in controlling her 
human relationships, the law should refuse an injunction against any 
employee who is willing to disgorge any economic profit from her breach of 
contract. Courts could properly enjoin an employee who could not dem-
onstrate improper conduct by her employer, and who would not disgorge 
the economic profit from her breach, from working for a competitor.77 
Accordingly, it is arguable that disgorgement damages should be paid by 
breaching employees to enable them to leave the service of employers for 
whom they no longer wish to work. Disgorgement damages better bal-
ance the competing interests of the parties than an injunction: on the one 
hand, they recognize the plaintiff's interest in the defendant's unique per-
formance, but on the other hand, they allow the defendant to get another 
job.78 In addition, the restraint of trade concerns which may arise when an 
injunction is awarded do not arise for disgorgement damages. 
5. Second sale cases and efficient breach 
It can be seen that substitutability helps to establish when disgorgement 
damages should be available for second sale cases, where a promisor 
breaches a contract to sell at a profit to a third party. 
Substitutability also helps to clarify when a promisor should be allowed 
to 'efficiently breach' in a second sale scenario. Efficient breach theory 
argues that a promisor should be able to breach his contract and enter into 
a more profitable contract with a third party/9 This is said to maximize 
efficiency in the marketplace. Clearly courts are concerned with such 
issues - the common law restraint of trade doctrine, for example, seeks to 
76 CT Wonnell, 'The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees' (1993) 46 Stan L Rev 87. 
77 Ibid 136 (emphasis added). 
78 Note Williams (n 53), where an Australian Rugby League player, Sonny Bill Williams, 
soughtto play for a French Rugby Union club, Toulon, in breach ofhis five-year contract to 
play with the Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd. The Bulldogs were successful in obtaining 
an injunction to restrain Williams from playing for Toulon, but released Williams after 
Toulon paid a 'transfer fee' of £300,000-effectively a partial disgorgement of profits by 
agreement. See <http://www. telegra ph.co. uk/sport/rugbyunion/club/2580942/Sonny-
Bill-Williams-set-to-make-Toulon-debut-against-Saracens- Rugby-Union.html>. 
79 See eg, R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th edn Aspen Law & Business, New York 
1998) 131-9. 
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maximize efficiency and competition in the marketplace. Equally clearly, 
if one accepts efficient breach without qualification, it is prima facie prob-
lematic for the second sale cases, which involve precisely this scenario. 
Disgorgement damages for breach of contract have been criticized by sup-
porters of efficient breach because they are said to remove the incentive 
for the promisor to breach his contract and enter into a more efficient 
'·· contract, 80 so that the only way the promisor can extricate himself from 
the contract is to negotiate a release from the contract. This is said to cre-
ate a 'bilateral monopoly' where the cost of negotiation between promisor 
and promisee is prohibitively high.81 
First, it is important to note that the assumptions which underlie effi-
cient breach have been questioned in certain important respects which 
will not be canvassed in detail here. 82 However, even if one accepts the 
fundamental premise, there will only be a bilateral monopoly where the 
subject matter of the contract is not available on the market. 83 
Let us say, for example, Alice has made a contract with Boris which says 
that Boris will supply her with 2,000 widgets. If widgets are incredibly 
rare, and Boris is the only supplier in the world market, Alice will not be 
able to procure a substitute performance. This means that there will be a 
bilateral monopoly if Boris wants to negotiate with Alice to get out of the 
contract, but in any case, it is likely that a court would not let Boris get out 
of the contract. Substitutability determines that this is a case for specific 
performance. 
80 See D Campbell, 'The Treatment of Teacher v Calder in AG v Blake' (2002) 65 MLR 
256; D Campbell and D Harris 'In Defence of Breach: A Critique of Restitution and the 
Performance Interest' (2002) 22 JLS 208; D Campbell, 'The Extinguishing of Contract 
(2004) 67 MLR 818. See also S de Long, 'The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a Remedy for 
Breach of Contract' (1989) 22 Ind L Rev 737, who accepts efficient breach theory, but rec-
ognizes that disgorgement may be economically efficient in some circumstances. Posner 
himself is prepared to allow breach where it is 'opportunistic': Posner (n 79) 119. 
81 SeeR O'Dair, 'Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach: Some Reflections' (1993) 46 CLP 113, 131; LD Smith, 'Disgorgement of the Profits 
of Breach of Contract: Property, Contract and "Efficient Breach"' (1995) 24 CBLJ 121, 
134-5; The! and Siegelman (n 14) 20. 
82 See IR Macneil, 'Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky' (1982) 68 VaL Rev 947; 
D Friedmann, 'The Efficient Breach Fallacy' (1989) 18 JLS 1; Smith (n 81); P Jaffey, 
'Efficiency, Disgorgement and Reliance in Contract: A Comment On Campbell and 
Harris' (2002) 22 LS 570; M Eisenberg, 'Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the 
Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law' (2005) 93 
California LR 975, 989-96; R Cunnington, 'Should Punitive Damages Be Part of the 
Judicial Arsenal in Contract Cases?' (2006) 26 LS 369, 384-9; Eisenberg (n 4) 571-2. 
83 The! and Siegelman (n 14) 20. 
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By contrast, if Boris wants to breach his contract with Alice, and she 
can easily procure the widgets from elsewhere, there will not be a bilat-
eral monopoly, and Boris will be free to breach or to negotiate a release. 
Therefore, substitutability helps to provide a more nuanced version of 
efficient breach theory, having regard to the scarcity or otherwise of the 
subject matter of the contract. 
This chapter now turns to the criteria for award of disgorgement dam-
ages for breach of negative covenant and breach of fiduciary duty in the 
so-called 'agency problem' cases. As will be seen, there is some overlap 
with the second sale cases, but the approach does need to be nuanced 
because of the particular policy considerations involved. 
C. Substitutability and the agency problem cases 
1. The overlap of breach of fiduciary duty and injunctions 
to restrain breach of negative covenant 
The contractual rights granted by negative covenants84 and those entailed 
in cases which involve fiduciary duties could be said to be intrinsically 
non-substitutable because they are intangible benefits which cannot be 
bought or sold in any market.85 Thus, these cases are broadly akin to the 
second sale cases where the defendant has put specific performance out 
of the reach of the plaintiff. Substitutability also helps explain breach of 
negative covenant cases where disgorgement is awarded as a surrogate for 
expectation damages.86 Nonetheless, substitutability does not provide a 
complete explanation of the outcome of the negative covenant cases. If 
substitutability were the sole criterion, then every breach of negative cov-
enant would give rise to disgorgement damages. However, this paper will 
suggest that something more is needed in the negative covenant cases. 
We need to compare breach of negative covenant cases with those cases 
involving concurrent breaches of fiduciary duty and contract in order to 
provide a more complete analysis. 
There is a kinship between cases involving breaches of negative coven-
ant and cases involving concurrent breaches of fiduciary duty and contract. 
84 It should be noted that the personal services cases are also negative covenant cases, but 
they will not be considered in this section as they fit better with the second sale cases. The 
negative covenant cases overlap with other areas, and thus have always been difficult to 
categorize. 
85 D Laycock, 'The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule' (1990) 103 Harv L Rev 687, 707-8. 
86 Eisenberg (n 4) 587-8. 
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This was adverted to by Lord Nicholls in Blake when he described George 
Blake's contractual obligations as 'closely akin to a fiduciary obligation'.87 
Whether Boris is subject to a fiduciary duty or a negative covenant, he 
contracts with Alice not to do a specific thing which relates to Alice's best 
interests, but Boris then breaches the contract and goes ahead and does 
the very thing which he has contracted not to do, and profits thereby. 
In the case of fiduciary duties Boris is obliged not to allow his personal 
interests to conflict with his duty to serve Alice's interests and not to make 
an unauthorized or secret profit. In the case of a negative covenant, Boris' 
obligation is not to do the particular thing specified in the negative cov-
enant. In addition, however, it will be argued that where trust is conferred 
on Boris, he also has an obligation not to profit, and if he does profit, that 
profit should be stripped from him. The common factor between the 
breach of fiduciary duty cases and the negative covenant cases is the trust 
conferred on the promisor. 
Both kinds of contract involve what Steve Thel and Peter Siegelman 
call 'the agency problem'.88 'Agency' in this context refers not to the legal 
concept of agency, but the economic concept of principal-agent. This 
form of analysis attempts to ascertain how a principal can design a con-
tract which motivates another individual, his agent, to act in the prin-
cipal's interests.89 An agency problem arises when there is information 
asymmetry concerning what action the agent either has undertaken 
or should undertake. Agency problems can create a situation of 'moral 
hazard' because the party that is insulated from risk generally has more 
information about its actions and intentions than the party paying for 
the negative consequences of the risk. Part of the difficulty in both fidu-
ciary duty cases and negative covenant cases is the difficulty the promisee 
has in monitoring the promisor's performan~e. The promisor can breach 
before the promisee has a chance to issue an injunction, and the breach 
cannot be undone. The promisor is not the one who suffers from the 
breach; indeed in these cases, he profits as a result. Therefore, addressing 
the agency problem means providing incentives for the agent to behave in 
accordance with the principal's wishes. 
The law of contract does not presently provide adequate incentives 
for a promisor in a negative covenant situation to perform the promise. 
If compensatory damages are inadequate and specific performance is no 
87 Blake (n 1) 287. 88 The! and Siegelman (n 14) 25. 
89 JE Stiglitz, 'Principal and Agent (ii)' in SN Durlauf and LE Blume (eds), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics (2nd edn Palgrave Macmillan, London 2008). 
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longer available, the promisor has discretion to breach which he should 
not have. In a situation like Blake, compensatory damages were inad-
equate. Blake, the 'notorious traitor', published an unauthorized auto-
biography in breach of his contract, and without the consent of the British 
government. His actions had not caused a pecuniary loss to the Crown 
which could be compensated. Nor could the government restrain George 
'·· Blake from publishing his book; it had already occurred. In addition, the 
purpose of the contract was not to make a profit, but to protect the gov-
ernment, and the case involved a relationship of trust and confidence. 
It is appropriate to have incentives to promote performance on the part 
of promisors in these kinds of contracts. This conclusion is not without 
precedent. As Robert Cooter and Bradley J Freedman have argued, the 
agency problem in breach of fiduciary duty has been dealt with by the 
availability of profit stripping remedies.90 
The chapter first explains the role of st}bstitutability in breach of nega-
tive covenant cases, and then turns to explore the agency problem in more 
detail. 
2. Substitutability in breach of negative 
covenant cases 
Although the primary focus of the negative covenant cases is the agency 
problem, substitutability is still a relevant factor, particularly where 
disgorgement is awarded as a surrogate for expectation damages.91 
Plaintiffs will wish to claim gain-based damages in circumstances where 
the defendant has benefited in a measurable way and has caused a loss 
which is speculative or hard to quantify.92 The kinds of case in which 
it is typically difficult to measure the losses of the plaintiff are intellec-
tual property infringement cases, in which it is very difficult to ascertain 
the plaintiff's losses resulting from the infringement, but the sales of the 
defendant are clear and quantifiable. Two of the post-Blake cases could 
be said to fit within this scenario: World Wide Fund for Nature v World 
Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc93 and Experience Hendrix LLC v 
90 R Cooter and BJ Freedman, 'The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and 
Legal Consequences' (1991) 66 NYULR 1045, 1047. 
91 Eisenberg (n 4) 587-8. 
92 D Laycock, 'The Scope and Significance of Restitution' (1989) 67 Tex L Rev 1277, 1287. 
93 [2001] EWHC Ch 482 ('WWF'). Although note the dismissive comments ofJacobs J at 
[62]: 'The fact that [the contract] relates to the use ofinitials and so is a bit "trademarkish" 
or "IPish" does not mean the common Ia~ should provide [disgorgement damages].' 
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PPX Enterprises Inc.94 Each case involved a settlement contract in which 
the defendant had breached an agreement not to use certain intellectual 
property belonging to the plaintiff (the initials 'WWF' in the first case 
and the recordings of Jimi Hendrix in the second case). In both cases, it 
was very hard for the court to ascertain the losses caused by the breach, 
but the profits were clear. 
,__ The nature of the breach of negative covenant cases is such that we will 
never know what would have happened had the defendant not breached 
the covenant, and therefore, the defendant has not only put specific relief 
out of the plaintiff's reach, he has also made it very difficult for her to cal-
culate her losses. The defendant has deprived the plaintiff of performance, 
the plaintiff cannot obtain a substitute performance, and nor can she be 
adequately compensated for her loss. 
However, although the principle of substitutability thus plays a role in 
determining disgorgement damages for breach of a negative covenant, 
it will be seen that agency problems and policy considerations also play 
a part in the breach of negative covenant cases. In order to see how the 
agency problem operates, it is first necessary to look at breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
3. The agency problem in breach of fiduciary 
duty cases 
It is clear that profit-stripping remedies are available where a fiduciary 
has profited from a breach of fiduciary duty.95 The reason for this stems 
from the nature of the fiduciary obligation itself. Fiduciaries are required 
to act in the interests of the beneficiary, and not in a self-interested fash-
ion. Fiduciary obligations have two principal aspects: 
(1) The fiduciary must not place him or herself in a position of conflict 
between his or her own interests and his or her duty to the beneficiary, 
nor may the fiduciary place himself or herself in a conflict between his 
or her duties to two or more beneficiaries. 
(2) The fiduciary must not make an unauthorized profit from his or her 
fiduciary position.96 
94 [2003] EWCA Civ 323 ('Experience Hendrix'). 
95 M Conaglen, 'The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty' (2005) 121 LQR 452, 463. 
96 Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, 199 (Deane J). 
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The deterrent philosophy of fiduciary law is said to demand that a 
fiduciary be prevented from profiting at the expense of a beneficiary.97 
Even bona fide fiduciaries must disgorge any unauthorized gains 
obtained in the discharge of their fiduciary role.98 
Fiduciary duties may be imposed outside the 'presumptive circle', 
even in the context of a contractual relationship which is ordinarily self-
.. interested. As Mason J noted in Hospital Products Ltd v United States 
Surgical Corporation,99 a person may come under a fiduciary relationship 
in a range of circumstances. 
The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes 
or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in 
the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that 
other person in a legal or practical sense. The relationship between the 
parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity 
to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that other person 
who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position ... 
It is partly because the fiduciary's exercise of the power or discretion can 
adversely affect the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed and 
because the latter is at the mercy of the former that the fiduciary comes 
under a duty to exercise his power or discretion in the interests of the per-
son to whom it is owed.100 
Alternatively, it is said that the fiduciary has the exercise of a power or 
discretion to which the beneficiary is vulnerable.101 
97 See Edelman (n 4) 83-5, 212; M Mcinnes, 'Account of Profits for Common Law Wrongs' 
in Degeling and Edelman (n 20) 405, 428; Conaglen (n 95) 463; ]Edelman, 'Gain-
Based Damages and Compensation' in A Burrows and Lord Rodger ofEarlsferry (eds), 
Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks(Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2006) 141, 147-50; A Duggan, 'Solicitors' Conflict oflnterest and the Wider Fiduciary 
Question' (2007) 45 CBLJ 414, 421-2; PD Finn, 'The Fiduciary Principle' in TG Youdan 
(ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, Toronto 1989) 26. CfL Smith, 'The Motive, 
Not the Deed' in J Getzler (ed), Rationalizing Property, Equity and Trusts: Essays in 
Honour of Edward Burn (LexisNexis Butterworths, London 2003) 53. 
98 See Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas King 61, 25 ER 223; Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 
46; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; Canadian Aero Service v O'Malley 
(1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371. 
99 (1984) 156 CLR41 ('Hospital Products'). 100 Ibid 96-7 (Mason J). 
101 There are also parallels with Dawson J's 'vulnerability' test from Hospital Products at 
ibid 142: 'There is, however, the notion underlying all the cases of fiduciary obligation 
that inherent in the nature of the relationship itselfis a position of disadvantage or vul-
nerability on the part of one of the parties which causes him to place reliance upon the 
other and requires the protection of equity acting upon the conscience of that other.' 
Dawson J's test was preferred by the Supreme Court of Canada in LAC Minerals Ltd v 
International Corona Resources Ltd [1989]2 SCR 574, 61 DLR (4th) 14. 
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Commentators have searched for a unifying principle of fiduciary 
relationships, but the cases are notoriously difficult to rationalize. Justice 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have suggested that the reason why it 
is difficult to discover a unifying principle of fiduciary relationships is 
because scholars are mistakenly looking for something unique or spe-
cial about fiduciary relationships.102 They argue that fiduciary relation-
~. ships are just one extreme of a spectrum of contractual and consensual 
relations.103 Fiduciary relationships tend to arise when a transaction is 
complex, and one party wishes to confer discretion on another, but it 
is too difficult specifically to enumerate each and every undertaking.104 
Fiduciary relationships are a species of voluntary undertaking where 
certain terms are implied into the agreement between the parties.105 
Another hallmark of the fiduciary relationship is that it is very diffi-
cult to monitor whether or not the fiduciary is undertaking his or her 
duties.106 Cooter and Freedman argue that because of the agency prob-
lem, fiduciaries are difficult to supervise, and therefore gain-stripping 
remedies are the law's way of controlling and penalizing fiduciar-
ies for any breach of duty.107 Disgorgement strips the fiduciary of his 
or her gain from misappropriation, so that from the fiduciary's per-
spective, it is as if the wrong had not been committed.108 Any incen-
tive to profit is removed. Disgorgement damages deter fiduciaries from 
misappropriation. 
The case which had particular resonance for the majority of the House 
of Lords in the Blake case was Snepp v United States,109 a fiduciary duty case 
which otherwise bore an uncanny resemblance to Blake. Snepp, a former 
employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was liable to disgorge 
profits made by releasing an unauthorized book about the United States', 
in particular the CIA's, activities in Vietnam. The US Supreme Court was 
prepared to find that Snepp owed concurrent contractual and fiduciary 
obligations to the CIA and awarded a constructive trust in favour of the 
CIA over the profits from Snepp's book. 
102 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, 'Contract and Fiduciary Duty' (1993) 26 J Law and 
Economics 425, 438. 
103 Ibid 425-38. 104 Ibid 426-7; The! and Siegelman (n 14) 24. 
w; See especially, J Edelman, 'When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?' (2010) 126 LQR 302; 
J Edelman, 'Four Fiduciary Puzzles', ch 13 in this collection; A Duggan, 'Contracts, 
Fiduciaries and the Primacy of the Deal', ch 12 in this collection. 
106 Cooter and Freedman (n 90) 1048-9; Easterbrook and Fischel (n 102) 427. 
107 Cooter and Freedman (n 90) 1046-7. 
108 Ibid 1051. 109 444 US 507 (1980) ('Snepp'). 
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The similarities between Blake and Snepp highlight the overlap between 
the fiduciary duty cases and the breach of negative covenant cases gener-
ally, because the rationale behind the two is so similar. It is trite to say 
that the label fiduciary has often been misused in order to achieve a just 
result.110 In particular, some cases seem to have been called 'fiduciary' 
merely to obtain the disgorgement remedies which fiduciary law offers. 
~-. Some of the cases which have been placed into the 'fiduciary basket' could 
be better analysed as cases where disgorgement damages were awarded 
for breach of a negative covenant.111 Clearly profit-stripping remedies are 
seen as an appropriate method of deterring breaches of fiduciary duty; it 
is suggested that the same should be the case with some negative covenant 
cases, particularly those where the promisor has a duty which involves 
the public interest or trust on the part of the promisee. 
4. The agency problem in breach of negative covenant cases 
As discussed, there is an overlap between cases involving injunctions 
to restrain a breach of negative covenant and cases involving concur-
rent breach of contract and fiduciary duty.112 One of the suggestions of 
the Court of Appeal in Blake was that disgorgement damages should be 
awarded where the defendant had done 'the very thing which he agreed 
not to do'.113 This was rejected by Lord Nicholls.U4 A better approach 
would be to qualify Lord Woolf's analysis by specifying that in negative 
covenant cases, the defendant agreed to do something for the benefit of 
the plaintiff and, if the defendant had kept his obligations, he would have 
foregone the profit he in fact obtained. Having done the very thing he had 
agreed not to do, and having made a profit thereby, the defendant should 
be obliged to disgorge that profit. 
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that negative covenants are often 
included in contracts where one party seeks to govern the future con-
duct of the other, but cannot specify exactly which obligations will arise 
in advance without costly and inconvenient negotiation.U5 They regard 
110 P Birks, 'Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Snepp and the Fusion of Law 
and Equity' [1987] LCMLQ 421. 
111 Some of the concurrent breach of fiduciary duty cases cited with approval in Blake 
could perhaps be better categorized as breach of negative covenant cases: see eg, Reid-
Newfoundland Cov Anglo-American Telegraph Co Ltd [1912] AC 555; Readingv Attorney-
General [1951] AC 507 (cf speech of Lord Denning in Readingv The King [1948]2 KB 268, 
276-7). 
112 Smith (n 81) 127. 113 Attorney-General v Blake [1998] Ch 439,458. 
114 Blake (n I) 286. 115 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 102) 444-5. 
SUBSTITUTABILITY AND DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES 399 
the negative covenant in the Snepp case as setting in train a process for 
making decisions in the future as to what Snepp could and could not 
write. Snepp should have tried to negotiate a second contract to ascertain 
exactly which parts of his manuscript could be published: 
The first contract established the employment relation and the submis-
sion requirement. The second contract would establish the terms of publi-
cation. Just as restitution plus an additional penalty induces the would-be 
thief to enter into market transactions instead, the profits remedy induces 
the parties to contract explicitly. It is a contract-inducing, not a contract-
frustrating. approach. 116 
On this analysis, the disgorgement remedy removes the incentive for the 
promisor to breach, and instead gives the promisor incentive to negotiate 
with the promisee. 
A further reason why disgorgement damages tend to be awarded for 
breaches of fiduciary duties or breach of negative covenant is because 
these contracts often involve a conferral of trust on the promisor by the 
promisee (to a greater or lesser degree), and therefore courts are will-
ing to say for public policy reasons that these contracts should not be 
breached.117 In circumstances where a contract is one which imports a 
special degree of trust or reliance, disgorgement damages will often be 
the best or only way to effectuate the contract and to give the promisor 
efficient incentives to perform.U8 It is also worth noting that punitive 
damages tend to be awarded for particular kinds of breach of contract 
where there is a special sense of trust, in which one party is open to being 
'used' by the other.ll9 These contracts include contracts of insurance and 
the like. 
Unfortunately, after Blake, courts have seemed unsure of how to treat 
cases involving brench of negative covenant. In each of WWP 20 and 
Experience Hendri~121 it is suggested that the contracts concerned typi-
fied the agency problem, and the plaintiffs had reposed trust in the defend-
ants. Accordingly, full disgorgement damages should have been payable. 
The settlement contracts in each case were essentially non-substitutable, 
and the loss suffered by the plaintiffs was uncertain and speculative. 
Further, in each case, the plaintiff had trusted the defendant to refrain 
from committing the very breach which occurred, and neither contract 
was designed to serve a profit-making purpose.122 Indeed, in both cases 
116 Ibid 444. 117 Eisenberg (n 4) 588-92. 118 Ibid 592. 
119 Chapman and Trebilcock (n 9) 765-7. 120 WWF (n 93). 
121 Experience Hendrix (n 94) (Mance LJ, Hooper J and Peter Gibson LJ). 
122 See following discussion on profit-making purpose. 
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the contract involved was a settlement, and thus the plaintiffs would have 
been forgiven for thinking that their troubles were over once the settle-
ment was entered into. It was difficult for the plaintiffs in each case to 
supervise the performance of the obligation. It is in precisely these sorts of 
circumstances that disgorgement remedies should be available, if a profit 
has been made.123 
There are other public policy reasons for imposing disgorgement dam-
ages. Melvin Eisenberg suggests disgorgement damages are awarded in 
cases where bargains were designed to serve interests other than profit-
making.124 He argues that: 
[C]ourts should protect the disgorgement interest in the case of bargain 
contracts that are not designed for profit-making purposes, so as to give 
the promisor in such contracts efficient incentive to perform, and effectu-
ate contracts of this type.125 
Blakeand Snepp involved national security interests, but this is not the 
only kind of case which raises public policy issues in the context of con-
tracts not entered into for profit. In British Motor Trade Association v 
Gilbert, 126 the defendant sought to sell his car in breach of a contractual 
term preventing the unauthorized sale of second-hand cars. An injunc-
tion restraining the breach had been obtained, but the defendant sold the 
car anyway. The policy of the post-World War II legislation which gave 
rise to the restraint in the contract was to regulate and limit the sale of 
cars to prevent an inflationary black market. The defendant was ordered 
to pay an account of profits made by him as a result of the breach of the 
injunction.127 Eisenberg argues that the contract in Gilbert created an 
'externality', which meant that the contract should benefit the public 
rather than the contracting parties. In these kinds of cases, disgorgement 
damages will be the best or only way to effectuate the contract and to 
give the promisor incentives to perform because the public may not have 
standing to sue.128 
The policy concerns in Snepp, Blake and Gilbert can be united under 
a single head of bargains designed to serve the public and interests other 
than profit-making. On this analysis, it is far more likely that a court will 
order disgorgement damages for breach of negative covenant or fiduciary 
123 SeeK Barnett, 'Deterrence and Disgorging Profits for Breach of Contract' [2009] RLR 
79,89-90. 
124 Eisenberg (n 4) 588. 125 Ibid 591. 126 [1951]2 AllER 641 ('Gilbert'). 
127 Ibid 645. 128 Eisenberg (n 4) 592. 
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duty if the purpose of the bargain was to serve the public, or to serve inter-
ests other than profit-making. 
D. Conclusion 
This chapter asserts that disgorgement damages cases may be divided 
~-.according to whether they are 'second sale' cases or 'agency problem' 
cases. As has been noted by other scholars, substitutability is an import-
ant key to establishing liability for disgorgement damages for breach of 
contract, but it must be nuanced according to the context. 
In the second sale cases, if the plaintiff can obtain a substitute perform-
ance, damages will be adequate. And if a court can still order specific 
relief, it should do so in preference to ordering disgorgement damages. 
Disgorgement damages will only be ordered if the performance was non-
substitutable, specific relief is no longer available and the defendant has 
made a profit. This still leaves room for the concept of'efficient breach' in 
a second sale case in certain circumstances, but only if the subject matter 
of the contract is substitutable. 
In the agency problem cases, the critical point is that there is a 
relationship of trust between the plaintiff and the defendant. Typically, 
the defendant has made a promise that he will not do something which 
would prejudice the plaintiff, which promise cannot be monitored by the 
plaintiff, but the defendant goes ahead and breaches anyway. In those cir-
cumstances, whether one classes the promise as fiduciary or not, there 
are public policy reasons for deterring such conduct. Disgorgement dam-
ages should be available in order to give efficacy to these promises. This is 
particularly the case where contracts are not-for-profit contracts, where · 
compensatory damages may not adequately protect the plaintiff's inter-
est in performance. Disgorgement damages provide an incentive for the 
defendant to perform or to negotiate a release rather than to leave a plain-
tiff 'high and dry'. 
